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INSIDE LAWYERS:
FRIENDS OR GATEKEEPERS?
Sung Hui Kim*
INTRODUCTION
In February 2014, after an unprecedented eleven-year delay, General
Motors Company (GM) announced a recall of 2.6 million vehicles due to a
defective ignition switch.1 The ignition switch, which fell below GM’s
own torque specifications, caused engines in certain Chevrolet Cobalt and
Saturn Ion cars to stall even at highway speeds and disabled airbags while
the cars were still in motion.2 By October 9, 2015, the number of deaths
attributable to the faulty ignition switch had climbed to 124 and the number
of injuries to 275.3 These tragic events prompt us to ask, once again, the
question first posed by Judge Stanley Sporkin in the aftermath of the
savings and loan debacles of the late 1980s: Where were the lawyers?4
Sadly, in GM’s case, the lawyers were right there.5 Though primary
blame should perhaps rest with GM’s engineers, who apparently did not
understand how their vehicles were built,6 GM’s inside lawyers,7 who
* Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. I am grateful for comments on prior drafts from
Iman Anabtawi, Oliver Budde, Bill Klein, Jim Fanto, Jim Park, Russell Pearce, Robert Eli
Rosen, Laurel Terry, and participants at the Lawyering in the Regulatory State colloquium
hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the Stein Center for Law and Ethics. Exemplary
research assistance was provided by Shannon Goddard and UCLA’s world class research
librarians. For an overview of the colloquium, see Nancy J. Moore, Foreword: Lawyering
in the Regulatory State, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811 (2016).
1. Sue Reisinger, The GM Lawyers Were Here, LAW.COM (July 1, 2014),
http://www.law.com/sites/articles/2014/07/01/the-gm-lawyers-were-here/ [https://perma.cc/
YVF2-QMWK].
2. ANTON VALUKAS, REPORT TO BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY
REGARDING IGNITION SWITCH RECALLS 1 (2014).
3. DETAILED OVERALL PROGRAM STATISTICS, GM IGNITION COMPENSATION CLAIMS
RESOLUTION FACILITY (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.gmignitioncompensation.com/docs/
Program%20Statistics%20(2015-10-09).pdf [https://perma.cc/7M54-W233].
4. See Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990)
(“Where were these professionals . . . when these clearly improper transactions were being
consummated?”).
5. Reisinger, supra note 1 (“The ignition switch debacle inevitably cast the legal team
in a harsh light and led to the oft-repeated phrase: Where were the lawyers? Well, they
were right here.”).
6. VALUKAS, supra note 2, at 2 (“A critical factor in GM personnel’s initial delay in
fixing the switch was their failure to understand, quite simply, how the car was built.”).
7. This Article uses “inside lawyers” and “inside counsel” interchangeably to refer to
corporate in-house counsel.
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handled engineering, safety, and products liability issues, must be faulted
for having obscured the deadly defect. The report of the internal
investigation conducted by Anton Valukas and commissioned by the GM
board8 (“the Valukas Report”) provides important details. As early as
2005, the GM lawyers knew about the Cobalt’s tendency to stall while in
motion, as contemporaneously reported by a barrage of negative press—
including from The New York Times and the Cleveland paper The Plain
Dealer.9 As early as 2007, a Wisconsin State Patrol report that explicitly
(and correctly) linked the defective ignition switch to an airbag failure in a
fatal Cobalt collision entered the legal department’s files.10 And, as early
as 2010, the lawyers understood that the Cobalt had a history of
unaddressed airbag nondeployments in known fatalities and were warned
by outside counsel that GM’s inaction could be interpreted as “egregious
conduct” and subject GM to punitive damages.11
Yet it was not until December 2013 that a GM lawyer finally notified
GM’s general counsel that there was even an issue involving a potential
recall,12 in spite of a written policy—in effect since 2003—that inside
attorneys should bring serious, unaddressed problems, including significant
safety issues, to the attention of the general counsel.13 What’s more, these
lawyers were not low-level attorneys squirreled away in some rogue foreign
branch office. They were highly experienced and trusted lawyers located at
GM’s headquarters, some of them in charge of committees tasked with
making high-level settlement and product recall decisions.14 After the
defect was fully communicated to the highest levels of the organization in
January 2014,15 four of GM’s inside lawyers were terminated.16 In October
2014, General Counsel Michael Millikin announced his resignation.17 With
the dust now settled, the overwhelming picture that emerges of the GM
lawyers is one of curious indifference.
A decade ago, a wave of corporate scandals involving more reprehensible
behavior but equally stunning examples of lawyer passivity motivated me
to write about the role of inside lawyers. In a series of articles, beginning in
8. VALUKAS, supra note 2.
9. Id. at 84–86.
10. Id. at 116–17. None of GM’s lawyers or engineers working on Cobalt matters
reported being aware of the Wisconsin State Patrol report until 2014. Id. at 118.
11. Id. at 10.
12. Id. at 211–13, 221, 224, 231. On February 6, 2014, GM’s General Counsel learned
about the specific facts relating to the Cobalt. Id. at 231.
13. Id. at 109–10.
14. See infra note 121 (discussing three GM lawyers).
15. VALUKAS, supra note 2, at 222–24.
16. The dismissed attorneys were: Jennifer Sevigny, Head of GM’s Field Performance
Assessment Group; Lawrence Buonomo, Practice Area Manager of Global Process &
Litigation and Head of Product Litigation and Chair of the Settlement Review Committee;
Michael Robinson, Vice President for Environmental, Sustainability and Global Regulatory
Affairs and former General Counsel for GM North America; William Kemp, Counsel for
Global Engineering Organization. Id. at 104–05, 158.
17. Bill Vlasic, In Surprise, Top Lawyer at G.M. Sets Retirement, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/18/business/michael-millikin-gms-top-lawyer-isretiring.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/P5GS-LCLR].
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2005 with The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel As
Gatekeeper,18 I suggested that it was improper for lawyers to be mere
bystanders while their client representatives violated their legal
obligations,19 especially when such violations were directly responsible for
gross harm inflicted on shareholders, employees, or third parties. In The
Banality of Fraud, I presented a diagnosis of the problem of inside lawyer
acquiescence in corporate fraud, criticized the reforms ostensibly enacted to
address the problem, and offered an alternative reform, which I believed
squarely addressed the structural deficiencies identified in my diagnosis.20
In making my arguments, I invoked the notion of a “gatekeeper,” which
in the capital markets context I defined as a “private intermediar[y] who can
prevent harm to the securities markets by disrupting the misconduct of [his
or her] client representatives.”21 At the time, it was widely recognized that
outside professional services providers, such as investment bankers,
auditors, securities analysts, outside securities attorneys, and credit rating
agencies, could perform gatekeeping functions that would benefit the
securities markets.22 Less acknowledged and examined was the fact that
inside lawyers could act as gatekeepers and possessed the capacity to stop
corporate misconduct in its tracks, as Ronald Gilson first observed in his
seminal article.23
More recently, in a 2011 essay entitled Who Let You into the House?,
Lawrence Hamermesh critiqued my reform and offered his
counterproposal.24 His central claim and complaint was that my alternative
reform would detrimentally impact the general counsel’s access to
information by discouraging informal conversations with senior
managers.25 To buttress his argument, Hamermesh invoked the analogy of
“lawyer as friend,”26 an analogy made famous by Charles Fried in his

18. Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel As
Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 985 (2005) [hereinafter Kim, Banality]; see also, e.g.,
Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411 (2008) [hereinafter Kim,
Gatekeepers]; Sung Hui Kim, Lawyer Exceptionalism in the Gatekeeping Wars, 63 SMU L.
REV. 73 (2010) [hereinafter Kim, Lawyer Exceptionalism]; Sung Hui Kim, Naked Self-Interest?
Why the Legal Profession Resists Gatekeeping, 63 FLA. L. REV. 129 (2011) [hereinafter Kim,
Naked Self-Interest].
19. By “violations,” I mean “material violation,” as defined by the SEC rules
implementing Sarbanes-Oxley. “Material violation” means a material violation of U.S.
federal or state securities law, a material breach of fiduciary duty arising under any federal or
state law, or a similar material violation of any federal or state law. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(i)
(2016).
20. See generally Kim, Banality, supra note 18.
21. Kim, Gatekeepers, supra note 18, at 413.
22. Id. at 416.
23. Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side
Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 884 (1990).
24. See generally Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Who Let You into the House?, 2012 WIS. L.
REV. 359.
25. Id. at 373–74.
26. See id. at 376.
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classic piece defending the moral praiseworthiness of the lawyer’s role.27
By relying on this analogy, Hamermesh strongly suggested that inside
lawyers should position themselves not so much as gatekeepers but as
friends to corporate senior managers.28
In this Article, I answer Hamermesh’s central complaint that, under my
reform, “general counsel would lose the benefit of the informal
communications from senior managers that invariably emerge in the context
of a relationship of trust and confidence.”29 I argue that the empirical
assumptions underlying Hamermesh’s complaint are not only unsupported
and speculative but also reflect a poor understanding of corporate
environments. And even if we assume that Hamermesh’s prediction about
general counsel’s access to information bears out, it is unlikely that his
predicted costs would offset all other benefits to be gained from my reform,
in particular, the enhanced willingness of inside counsel to interdict
wrongdoing in serious cases.
Turning to Hamermesh’s invocation of the “lawyer as friend” analogy, I
argue that the notion of friendship elides the gravity of the relevant factual
context and thus cannot provide useful guidance for how inside counsel
should conduct themselves in the face of serious corporate wrongdoing.
“Friendship” also mischaracterizes how employees ordinarily interact with
one another in organizational settings and grossly misrepresents how some
general counsel perceive their relations with senior managers and
understand their fiduciary obligations to the corporate client. Thus, as a
model for inside counsel, the friendship analogy is strained, inapt, and
should be avoided.
Part I of this Article sets the stage by contrasting two alternative
proposals to reform the inside lawyer’s role—my reform and Hamermesh’s
counterreform. Part II discusses the primary empirical disagreements
between the two approaches. Part III interrogates the propriety and the
utility of invoking the “lawyer as friend” analogy as a model to guide inside
counsel’s relationships with managers.
I. TWO ALTERNATIVE REFORMS
In The Banality of Fraud, I argued that one could understand why inside
lawyers acquiesce in fraud by combining insights from decades of social
scientific research on the causes of unethical behavior with known facts
about inside lawyers’ roles inside the corporation.30 Combining these
insights and facts allows us to construct and analyze the “ethical ecology”31
of inside counsel. As I argued, this ethical ecology emerges from the

27. See Charles Fried, The Lawyer As Friend: The Moral Foundations of the LawyerClient Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); see also infra notes 135–41 and accompanying
text (discussing Fried’s article).
28. See infra notes 124–31 and accompanying text.
29. Hamermesh, supra note 24, at 374.
30. Kim, Banality, supra note 18, at 1001–34.
31. See generally id.
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multiple roles that inside lawyers inhabit.32 These roles, in turn, unleash
psychological pressures that strongly affect the actions and choices of
inside lawyers.33 In simplified terms, inside counsel act as “mere
employees” subject to obedience pressures, as “faithful agents” subject to
alignment pressures, and as “team players” subject to conformity
pressures.34 These pressures explain why some inside lawyers turn a blind
eye to unethical corporate behavior. The following diagram illustrates,
somewhat crudely, this complex ethical ecology.
The Ethical Ecology of Inside Counsel

Given my diagnosis, I was not sanguine about the reforms enacted in the
aftermath of Enron to address the problem of lawyer acquiescence in
fraud.35 However, in the spirit of scholarly experimentation and utility, I
prodded readers to imagine what an alternative reform—one with “teeth”
and responsive to the diagnosis presented—might look like. Hence, in the
last twenty-two pages of the article, I explained my tripartite alternative
structural reform, which should mitigate some of the obedience, alignment,
and conformity pressures arising out of inside counsel’s multiple roles. The
basic tenets of my reform were that
(1) public companies transfer the oversight of the corporate legal
department to a committee of independent board members;
(2) the law guarantee whistle-blower protection to inside counsel under
Sarbanes-Oxley and, accordingly, permit the disclosure of client
confidences under any claim alleging retaliation under SarbanesOxley or a common law claim of retaliatory discharge; and
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1034–40.
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(3) public companies limit ex ante the amount of equity investments that
an inside lawyer may accept as compensation or, in the alternative,
fashion equity compensation in a manner that minimizes potential
conflicts of interest.36

To be clear, I was not so delusional as to think that any of my reforms
would soon or ever be enacted (or that my reform would serve as a
panacea). Far-reaching reform that genuinely addresses deep structural
problems, such as climate change or campaign finance, is rarely politically
feasible—even after a major crisis or scandal. Still, I believed, and
continue to believe, that legal scholars should not be constrained in their
writing to propose only that which is politically feasible in the moment.
Indeed, it would be a sorry state of affairs if academics systematically
limited themselves to minor tweaks to the status quo.
Turning to Hamermesh’s critique of The Banality of Fraud, he took issue
with my reforms, calling them “radical,”37 while neglecting to challenge
any aspect of the diagnosis on which those reforms were based. He was
especially displeased with the proposal to “re-situat[e] control of general
counsel’s hiring and supervision”38 to a “committee of independent board
members who may be organized as the audit committee or a separate”
Qualified Legal Compliance Committee, as defined in the regulations of the
Securities and Exchange Commission39 (SEC). That proposal was designed
to mitigate inside lawyers’ obedience pressures and to redress the sad
reality that many general counsel lack independent access to the board, as
was demonstrably the case with Tyco’s former general counsel Mark
Belnick.40 As radical as my proposal may have seemed at the time, similar
proposals have been, and as recently as 2015 continue to be, embraced by
other legal scholars.41 Incidentally, a similar restructuring has been widely
adopted for chief compliance officers in the financial industry.42

36. Id.
37. Hamermesh, supra note 24, at 367, 369, 372, 374, 386 (referring to my reform as
“radical” on five occasions).
38. Id. at 374.
39. Kim, Banality, supra note 18, at 1055.
40. Id. at 1054.
41. See, e.g., Kabir Ahmed & Dezso Farkas, A Proposal to Encourage Up-The-Ladder
Reporting by Insulating In-House Corporate Attorneys from Managerial Power, 39 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 861, 883 (2015) (“[T]he authors propose to modify the procedure for up-the-ladder
reporting to bypass the CEO at every stage in the process. . . . [T]he authors propose that a
separate committee of the Board comprised of independent directors be made responsible for
hiring the company’s CLO and the final approval over terminating the employment of the
CLO and any corporate attorneys that work directly for the firm.”); Rutheford B. Campbell,
Jr. & Eugene R. Gaetke, The Ethical Obligation of Transactional Lawyers to Act As
Gatekeepers, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 9, 42 (2003); Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There
a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097, 1136 (2003);
Robert Eli Rosen, Resistances to Reforming Corporate Governance: The Diffusion of
QLCCs, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1251, 1253 (2005). Some proposals are less radical and more
politically feasible, but nonetheless incorporate a mandatory element. See, e.g., Stephen M.
Bainbridge & Christina J. Johnson, Managerialism, Legal Ethics, and Sarbanes-Oxley
Section 307, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 299, 324 (“The SEC might have required . . . that the
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Hamermesh admonished that “access and respect . . . would not be as
readily accorded to a general counsel more generally perceived and situated
as ‘cop’ or ‘gatekeeper.’”43 As a consequence, “general counsel would lose
the benefit of the informal communications from senior managers,”44
which—Hamermesh clarified—“is the central issue raised by [his]
Essay.”45 In conclusion, Hamermesh declared: “It certainly cannot be
assumed that a radical alteration in the relationship between general counsel
and senior management will have no impact on general counsel’s access to
internal corporate information.”46
audit committee and/or the board meet periodically with the general counsel outside the
presence of other managers and inside directors.”).
42. James A. Fanto, Surveillant and Counselor: A Reorientation in Compliance for
Broker-Dealers, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1121, 1134–35. Also, under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, for an organization to be deemed to have an effective ethics and compliance
program for purposes of calculating the culpability score,
[s]pecific individual(s) within the organization shall be delegated day-to-day
operational responsibility for the compliance and ethics program. Individual(s)
with operational responsibility shall report periodically to high-level personnel
and, as appropriate, to the governing authority, or an appropriate subgroup of the
governing authority, on the effectiveness of the compliance and ethics program.
To carry out such operational responsibility, such individual(s) shall be given
adequate resources, appropriate authority, and direct access to the governing
authority or an appropriate subgroup of the governing authority.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2)(C) (2014),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2014/CHAPTER_8.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U23D-WQNS].
43. Hamermesh, supra note 24, at 373.
44. Id. at 374.
45. Id.
46. Id. This statement and others like it are straw men. For another straw man, see id. at
377 (“[I]t is at least as speculative to conclude that re-situating control of general counsel
will have no effect on informal cooperation and sharing of information by management.”).
In fact, I expressly acknowledged the possibility of negative consequences under my
hypothetical reform. See Kim, Banality, supra note 18, at 1058–63 (noting potential
objections to my proposed reform based on ineffectiveness, impracticability, and
circumvention). Additionally, I devoted an entire section in Gatekeepers Inside Out to the
issue of how managers might circumvent both in-house and outside lawyers. See Kim,
Gatekeepers, supra note 18, at 457–60 (Part V). Elsewhere, Hamermesh seems to
acknowledge that I addressed these potential negative consequences in my article but
neglects to respond to my specific arguments. See Hamermesh, supra note 24, at 373
(“[Kim] explains the possibility that ‘corrupt’ senior management could simply choose not to
consult with inside counsel, and thereby circumvent counsel’s gatekeeping influence.”).
For yet another stark example of Hamermesh’s habit of mischaracterizing my arguments,
see Hamermesh, supra note 24, at 374 & n.52 (“Kim quotes Professor Koniak for the
proposition that ‘without lawyers, few corporate scandals would exist and fewer still would
succeed long enough to cause any significant damage.’ . . . Kim adds nothing to back up that
remarkable statement.” (emphasis added)). First, Hamermesh mischaracterizes the actual
text for which Professor Koniak’s work was cited. The actual statement for which I cited
her work was other than what Hamermesh claims. The actual statement was: “[M]ost
significant frauds require the cooperation or acquiescence from inside lawyers.” See Kim,
Banality, supra note 18, at 1062 & n.481. Second, Hamermesh misleadingly suggests that
Koniak’s work was the sole source cited to support the text. In fact, her work was just one
of three sources cited in the specific footnote to support my statement. See id. at 1062 n.481.
Third and more fundamentally, in light of the extensive social psychological evidence that I
marshaled in The Banality of Fraud to demonstrate that acquiescence in fraud is banal,
Hamermesh needs to either (i) contest the evidence or (ii) provide some explanation as to
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If Hamermesh’s main point was to highlight that there may be trade-offs
from adopting my reform, I could not agree more. Indeed, it would be odd
for any meaningful reform not to have trade-offs.
I expressly
acknowledged some trade-offs, including the possibility that managers
might avoid or circumvent inside lawyers.47 The important issue, of course,
is not whether trade-offs exist but whether they are on net beneficial. But I
will defer that specific discussion to Part II below.
The other possibility is that Hamermesh was presenting yet another tired
defense of the status quo. If so, we should not be surprised. As William
Simon observed, the most common response of the legal profession to any
attempts at reform has been to “circl[e] the wagons” around traditional
standards.48 Histories of congressional and regulatory attempts to impose
even minimal responsibilities on lawyers to prevent client fraud reveal
fierce and organized opposition from the American Bar Association and its
state counterparts.49 Hamermesh’s essay may ultimately be just another
example of this penchant for resisting outside regulation. Predictably,
Hamermesh displays the common judgmental biases that characterize the
rhetoric of lawyers dodging regulation,50 including, among others, the
omission bias (the systematic tendency to discount harms arising from
inaction as opposed to action) and the status quo bias (the systematic
tendency to prefer the current state of affairs to a different state of affairs).51
Of course, apologists for the status quo never want to come off as
apologists. Accordingly, in lieu of my three measures, Hamermesh
proposed an impressive seven measures, which, he claimed, would
“promote general counsel’s independence and contribut[e] to effective
corporate governance”52—without generating the types of negative
consequences that might arise from adopting my reforms. Those measures
are
(1) explicitly and continually identifying general counsel’s independence
as a norm and expectation by consensus of both independent directors
and senior managers;

why lawyers would be more immune to the psychological pressures that I identified.
Hamermesh does neither; instead, he simply asserts that it is “remarkable” that anyone
would think that lawyers acquiesce in fraud to any significant degree. Unfortunately, such a
declaration is not an argument, let alone a rebuttal.
47. See Kim, Banality, supra note 18, at 1062–63.
48. William H. Simon, After Confidentiality:
Rethinking the Professional
Responsibilities of the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1453 (2006).
49. See, e.g., Kim, Lawyer Exceptionalism, supra note 18, at 77–93 (Part I); Susan P.
Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done: The Bar’s Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1236 (2003); Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN.
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 9, 11 (2002) [hereinafter Rhode & Paton I]; Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D.
Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS 625, 645 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) [hereinafter
Rhode & Paton II].
50. For an analysis of the biases, see Kim, Naked Self-Interest, supra note 18.
51. Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality Bias in Legal Decision
Making, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 583, 593, 597 (2003).
52. Hamermesh, supra note 24, at 379.
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(2) involving independent directors in interviewing and evaluating
general counsel candidates;
(3) encouraging the CEO to consult with independent directors in
selecting the general counsel;
(4) encouraging the CEO to consult with independent directors in
designing and revising the general counsel’s compensation package;
(5) encouraging the CEO to establish a relationship with the general
counsel in which the general counsel has direct access to the CEO,
and in which the general counsel is expected to engage in an advisory
function rather than simply manage delegation of responsibility for
providing legal services to the corporation;
(6) providing regular opportunities for the independent directors to
consult with the general counsel in an “executive session,” outside the
presence of the CEO and other senior managers; and
(7) otherwise encouraging independent directors to consult with the
general counsel, without the intervention of other senior managers.53

It is quite possible that Hamermesh’s measures will generate no negative
consequences. But that is hardly the standard by which reform should be
judged. After all, one way in which a proposal might have no negative
impact is by having no impact—good or bad. When one glances at the
verbs employed in Hamermesh’s measures (the principal verb being
“encourag[e]”), one not only wonders whether these measures will have any
impact but also whether that was the intention.
Turning from his verbs to his omissions, Hamermesh categorically
rejects any reform that addresses the structural forces likely to lead inside
lawyers to succumb to psychological pressures in their multiple roles.54 He
rejects any attempt to guarantee the general counsel formal independent
access to the board, even though many inside counsel desire greater access
to the board.55 Even creating a dotted line reporting relationship from the
general counsel to a committee of independent directors would, no doubt,
be seen as “too subversive.” Additionally, he neglects to address the
perverse incentive effects associated with compensating counsel in equity,
which many legal academics believe to be problematic.56 Further, he fails

53. Id. at 362.
54. Id. at 361.
55. In a survey of 1216 in-house counsel conducted in 2003, “44 percent believed that
better access to the board of directors was needed to ensure the well-being of their
company.” Chad R. Brown, In-House Counsel Responsibilities in the Post-Enron
Environment, ACCA DOCKET, May 2003, at 92, 97.
56. See, e.g., Z. Jill Barclift, Corporate Responsibility: Ensuring Independent Judgment
of the General Counsel—A Look at Stock Options, 81 N.D. L. REV. 1 (2005); John S.
Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in Lawyer Independence: Lawyer Equity
Investments in Clients, 81 TEX. L. REV. 405, 414 (2003); Kim, Banality, supra note 18, at
1007 n.143 (reporting the views of Richard Painter and Susan Koniak); Donald C.
Langevoort, When Lawyers and Law Firms Invest in Their Corporate Clients’ Stock, 80
WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 570 (2002); Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest for In-House Counsel:
Issues Emerging from the Expanding Role of the Attorney-Employee, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 497,
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to even acknowledge the need to protect inside lawyers from retaliation, a
measure favored by a chorus of legal academics57 as well as inside
lawyers.58 This particular omission is troubling in light of recent findings
that 21 percent of U.S. workers who reported misconduct at their workplace
also reported suffering from retaliation.59
The impotent verbs and the glaring omissions suggest that Hamermesh is
advancing little more than a precatory laundry list of incremental best
practices.60 While there is nothing inherently wrong with best practices,
best practices do not have a strong track record of success with those
companies representing the lion’s share of the problem—prominent, largecapitalization companies widely known to have dysfunctional corporate
cultures, such as GM, Enron, WorldCom, and, now, Volkswagen.61 For
example, Jeffrey Gordon observed that Enron had implemented nearly all of
the best practices proposed by corporate governance authorities—
“independent directors, specialized committees (especially an audit
committee) consisting exclusively of independent directors to perform
crucial monitoring functions, and clear charter of board authority,” as well

540 (1997); Poonam Puri, Taking Stock of Taking Stock, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 99 (2001);
Rhode & Paton I, supra note 49, at 25.
57. See generally Eric Alden, Blocking the Ax: Shielding Corporate Counsel from
Retaliation As an Alternative to White Collar Hypercriminalization, 36 U. HAW. L. REV. 95
(2014); Grace M. Giesel, The Ethics or Employment Dilemma of In-House Counsel, 5 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 535, 540 (1992); Stephen Gillers, Protecting Lawyers Who Just Say No, 5.
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1998); Nancy Kubasek, M. Neil Browne & Julie Harris, The Social
Obligation of Corporate Counsel: A Communitarian Justification for Allowing In-House
Counsel to Sue for Retaliatory Discharge, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 665, 688 (1997); Alex
B. Long, Whistleblowing Attorneys and Ethical Infrastructures, 68 MD. L. REV. 786, 790
(2009); Jennifer M. Pacella, Conflicted Counselors: Retaliation Protections for AttorneyWhistleblowers in an Inconsistent Regulatory Regime, 33 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming
2016); Daniel S. Reynolds, Wrongful Discharge of Employed Counsel, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 553 (1988); Sally R. Weaver, Client Confidences in Disputes Between In-House
Attorneys and Their Employer-Clients: Much Ado About Nothing—Or Something?, 30 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 483 (1997).
58. See Brown, supra note 55, at 97 (reporting that “48 percent [of 1216 attorneys
serving as general counsel or other in-house counsel] believed that establishment of laws
protecting attorney whistleblowers” was necessary to ensure the well-being of the
organizational client).
59. ETHICS RES. CTR., NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY 13 (2013).
60. Alden, supra note 57, at 165 & n.211 (“This is in essence a precatory list of
suggested best practices, and nothing more.”).
61. See DENNIS B. BERESFORD ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL
INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF WORLDCOM, INC. 18–24 (2003)
(describing WorldCom’s corporate culture); Ronald R. Sims & Johannes Brinkmann, Enron
Ethics (Or: Culture Matters More than Codes), 45 J. BUS. ETHICS 243 (2003) (discussing
the culture at Enron); Ben W. Heineman, Jr., GC and CEO Responsibility for GM’s
Dysfunctional Culture, CORP. COUNS. ONLINE (June 6, 2014) (available online through Lexis
Advance) (discussing GM’s “badly broken safety culture”); Jerry Useem, What Was
Volkswagen Thinking?, ATLANTIC, Jan./Feb. 2016, at 26, 28, http://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/2016/01/what-was-volkswagen-thinking/419127/ (discussing culture in
connection with the recent Volkswagen scandal) [https://perma.cc/8E5N-HA7T].
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as stock-based compensation for directors.62 Yet, the Enron board was
“ineffectual in the most fundamental way, the Audit Committee particularly
somnolent if not supine.”63 In these types of companies, making the banal
recommendation that board members should pay more attention to their
general counsel is not likely to do much. As Eric Alden, a former equity
partner of two AmLaw 100 law firms, predicted, “[Hamermesh’s] soft,
precatory measures . . . would leave the status quo in effect unchanged.”64
II. EMPIRICAL DISAGREEMENTS
As noted above, Hamermesh posited that “access and respect . . . would
not be as readily accorded to a general counsel more generally perceived
and situated as ‘cop’ or ‘gatekeeper.’”65 Accordingly, “[G]eneral counsel
would lose the benefit of the informal communications from senior
managers that invariably emerge in the context of a relationship of trust and
confidence.”66 Hence, the crux of Hamermesh’s critique is his central
prediction that, under my reform, the general counsel would lose access to
information via informal communication channels.67 Part II explores this
central prediction and the attendant empirical disagreements that ground our
disparate approaches.
Let me start off by noting that Hamermesh offers no direct or indirect
empirical evidence to support the central prediction lying at the heart of his
critique.68 Let me also concede that, given the paucity of relevant data on
the subject, that omission is hardly cause for protest. Less forgivably,
however, Hamermesh offers no explicit theory to explain why or how
transferring the oversight of the corporate legal department to a committee
of independent board members should chill informal conversations between
the general counsel and senior managers. On close examination, it becomes
clear that his central prediction is predicated on a vague and undefended
behavioral assumption.69
Hamermesh’s principal behavioral assumption is that general counsel’s
demeanor would change once the reassignment takes place.70 According to

62. Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the
Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1241
(2002).
63. Id.
64. Alden, supra note 57, at 164.
65. Hamermesh, supra note 24, at 373.
66. Id. at 374.
67. See id.
68. There is one exception in which indirect evidence is arguably marshaled;
unfortunately, it does not support Hamermesh’s contention. See infra notes 170–75 and
accompanying text.
69. Id.
70. I am not the first to notice that Hamermesh implicitly posits this behavioral
assumption. See Alden supra note 57, at 165 (“The structural centerpiece of [Hamermesh’s]
argument is that corporate counsel which is protected from retaliatory termination and
supervised directly by the audit committee will begin to be perceived (presumably based on
actual conduct) as a ‘cop’ and ‘gatekeeper,’ whereas counsel which lives in fear of
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Hamermesh, managers will avoid a general counsel who is “actively
“aggressively
independent,”72
“distant,”73
and
independent,”71
74
75
“adversarial” —akin to a “cop” or an “adversarial monitor.”76 He
doesn’t explain why this should occur or even what actively independent, as
opposed to just independent, behavior looks like. Does an “actively
independent” or “adversarial” general counsel report up the ladder more
frequently? Apparently not, as Hamermesh explicitly denies that he is
making any claims about the likelihood of reporting misconduct up the
ladder.77 Without any explanation as to what “actively independent” or
“adversarial” entails in terms of real behavior or why such alleged behavior
should come about, we are left with the vague objection that the general
counsel will respond to a reassignment in a way that would invariably be
perceived as deeply alienating to senior managers, causing senior managers
to clam up in the company of the general counsel.
These types of vague and hyperbolic objections are not new. In prior
work analyzing the bar’s reactions to post-Enron calls for reform, I
observed how the bar worried about lawyers being “‘overanxious,’ as
‘cry[ing] wolf,’ . . . acting in an ‘imprudent and uninformed manner,’ and
making ‘mountains’ out of ‘mole hills.’”78 In fact, I anticipated objections
of this ilk when I first proposed my reform. In The Banality of Fraud, I
expressly addressed the concern that “an ambitious, overeducated, newly
empowered, and more independent inside lawyer will become unduly
confrontational and uncooperative, making frequent and unnecessary
reports (‘false alarms’) to the board.”79 In response to this concern, I wrote:
[I] believe that this scenario is very unlikely, precisely because there is no
way to eliminate conformity pressures. Pressures to be a “team player,”
despite all of my reforms, will remain and persist substantially. To the
termination will conduct themselves in such a way so as to be perceived as being a ‘close
friend’ of the senior business managers.” (emphasis added)).
71. Hamermesh, supra note 24, at 376.
72. Id. at 386.
73. Id. at 378.
74. Id. at 376.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 378.
77. Hamermesh explicitly denies that he is making the claim that managerial candor will
erode due to an expectation of diminished confidentiality in anticipation of more frequent
reports up the ladder. He notes that the issue of whether protecting in-house counsel (after
they’ve blown the whistle and revealed confidences) would “discourage communication[s]
from [managers]” is a “somewhat different context” and that he is concerned only about
“chilling communication[s] resulting from re-situating control of the general counsel.” Id. at
377. He also notes that my citation of empirical evidence casting doubt on the link between
expectations about confidentiality and client candor “does not directly address the point
[made in his essay],” yet again emphasizing that he is making no claim about the impact of
an expectation of diminished confidentiality. Id.
78. Kim, Naked Self-Interest, supra note 18, at 152 (quoting Letter from the N.Y.C. Bar
Ass’n to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Apr. 7, 2003), http://www.abcny.org/pdf/report/
300062186_4.pdf [http://perma.cc/3P2F-FWUA]); Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP to
Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Apr. 7, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/
sullivan040703.htm [http://perma.cc/UV59-265V].
79. Kim, Banality, supra note 18, at 1075.
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extent that these pressures will reduce the likelihood of opportunistic and
overly aggressive inside lawyer conduct, conformity pressures can be
good.80

No one, not even a director or lawyer, is immune to conformity pressures,
which are automatically triggered by group membership and organizational
settings.81 And no amount of redrawing of reporting lines can eliminate the
team player pressures “to go along to get along” that are ubiquitous in
corporate workplaces.82 Further, those pressures are likely to inhibit the
dramatic change in the general counsel’s demeanor, a change that
Hamermesh apparently assumes.
Additionally, Hamermesh ignores the fact that, even under my reform,
the general counsel can still be terminated. Directors can still lose faith in
the general counsel for all sorts of reasons, including for not being
sufficiently creative in devising outside-the-box legal solutions to business
problems or for simply being “obstreperous” and “difficult to work with.”
And while in recent years directors have generally become more
independent from the CEO, there are many companies in which boards still
operate like rubber-stamps for the CEO83—a possibility that even
Hamermesh acknowledges.84
Also, Hamermesh conveniently ignores the available empirical evidence
on the behavior of lawyers—evidence that tends to undermine his
behavioral assumption. For example, in 1985, sociologist Robert Nelson
reported in his survey of 224 randomly selected lawyers that only
approximately 16 percent of respondents reported ever having refused an
assignment or potential work due to a conflict with their personal values
(very broadly defined).85 And of the forty-six individuals who claimed to
have refused work, only ten (out of 224) reported doing so because the
client was committing a crime,86 and only one lawyer reported convincing a
client not to proceed for ethical reasons.87 In another study of 787
randomly selected lawyers conducted in 1995, John Heinz et al. reported
that only 20 percent of lawyers working in law firms of over one hundred
lawyers, and only 9 percent of inside lawyers, admitted to ever having
refused an assignment due to a conflict with their personal values.88 In
2004, Roger Cramton et al. observed, “[I]t is clear that the incidence of
80. Id.
81. See id. at 1019–24 (discussing conformity pressures).
82. See id. at 1024–25 (discussing conformity pressures in the workplace, particularly
with respect to the stigma associated with dissent).
83. Bainbridge & Johnson, supra note 41, at 304 (“There are still management-captured
boards, even if there are not as many as there used to be.”).
84. Hamermesh, supra note 24, at 381 (noting that a board’s formal approval of the
CEO’s decision to hire general counsel “may frequently amount to little more than a rubber
stamp”).
85. Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values
and Client Relationships in the Large Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503, 535–36 (1985).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR
117 (2005).
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whistleblowing by lawyers is astonishingly low given the fact that most or
all states require disclosure when a crime or fraud has been perpetrated on a
tribunal.”89 Perhaps most revealing, since 2002, lawyers “appearing and
practicing before the [SEC] in any way in the representation of issuers”90
have been granted the discretion to report out to the SEC, without the
issuer’s consent, confidential information relating to unrectified material
law violations.91 To date, no lawyer has reportedly done so. The
aforementioned empirical evidence suggests that the scenario of an unduly
confrontational or “adversarial” general counsel is overblown.
If the evidence on the behavior of lawyers does not persuade, perhaps the
evidence on auditors will. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the
“‘public watchdog’ function [of auditors] demands that the accountant
maintain total independence from the client at all times and requires
complete fidelity to the public trust.”92 Yet, the evidence to date suggests
that even auditors rarely display so-called “actively independent” behavior.
Since 1995, auditors have been under a statutory obligation to report to the
SEC any unrectified law violations encountered in their work for public
corporate clients.93 Given the number of public companies registered with
the SEC—almost 12,000 by the end of 199994—one might expect the
number of auditors reporting out law violations to be in the hundreds. To
the contrary, from 1995 to 2003, auditors reported only twenty-nine
violations.95
Of course, one could believe that lawyers and auditors do not report
violations because there are so few violations to report. But that belief
seems contrary to what is generally known about the various forms of
89. Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen & Susan P. Koniak, Legal and Ethical Duties
of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725, 816–17 (2004).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2012).
91. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) (2014).
92. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984).
93. See Private Securities Law Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 301, 109 Stat.
737, 762–64 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1); John C. Coffee, Jr., Attorney As
Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1294, 1306 (2003).
94. See Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company
Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the Bottom”,
54 VAND. L. REV. 231, 242 (2001) (citing SEC, DIRECTORY OF COMPANIES REQUIRED TO FILE
ANNUAL REPORTS WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 1 (1999) (reporting the
number of public companies from 1983 to 1999)). By 1999, the number was 11,998. Id.
95. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT: REVIEW OF
REPORTING UNDER SECTION 10A (2003) (reporting violations from 1995 to 2003).
Of course, this evidence might lead one to (reasonably) think that imposing
gatekeeping duties on lawyers is futile. To that objection, I responded:
But we live in a world of neither perfect solutions nor ideal gatekeepers, so the
relevant issue is not so much whether lawyers make good gatekeepers in some
absolute sense but always as compared to what? . . . Suffice it to say that . . . it
seems odd to exempt those professionals who are presumably most adept at
identifying law violations.
Kim, Naked Self-Interest, supra note 18, at 159–60. Also, Tanina Rostain’s study suggests
that the gatekeeper vision is attainable—at least for some general counsel. See Tanina
Rostain, General Counsel in the Age of Compliance: Preliminary Findings and New
Research Questions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 473–80 (2008).
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organizational misconduct, including, for example, securities fraud. While
there is no way of ascertaining with any precision the total incidence of
securities fraud, we do know that public company restatements of financial
data, which reduce previously reported income, are not exactly rare. From
2003 to 2012, there were 2422 financial restatements announced by public
companies in which the restatement reduced previously reported income, of
which over 1300 were sufficiently material to have been reported on the
SEC Form 8-K.96 Turning to other workplace infractions, survey evidence
suggests that workplace ethical breaches are not uncommon.97 For
example, in surveys conducted annually since 2000 by the Ethics Resource
Center, between 41 and 55 percent of the employee-respondents98 reported
that they had observed some type of misconduct in the workplace.99 We
also know that other unethical behavior—e.g., cheating—is believed to be
widespread.100 Several laboratory studies on cheating found that people
tend to “cheat when given . . . an easy, unverifiable opportunity to do
so.”101 A recent experiment conducted on bank professionals found that “a
significant proportion” of these bankers cheated in a simple coin-flip
experiment.102 With respect to consumer fraud in the United States, the
Federal Trade Commission estimates that there were 37.8 million incidents
of fraud in 2011, and Stanford University’s Financial Fraud Research
Center estimates the annual cost of fraud to be over $52 billion.103 While

96. SUSAN SCHOLZ, FINANCIAL RESTATEMENT TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES: 2003–
2012, at 14 fig.9 (2012), http://www.thecaq.org/docs/reports-and-publications/financialrestatement-trends-in-the-united-states-2003-2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/PWA9-HUVH]. Of
course, we have no way of knowing what percentage of these errors were intentional.
97. See ETHICS RES. CTR., supra note 59, at 15.
98. The Ethics Resource Center has “polled and reported findings on more than 34,000
[public sector] employees” over the course of its ethics research. Id. at 10. Respondents in
the 2013 survey “were 18 years of age or older; currently employed at least 20 hours per
week for their primary employer; and working for a company that employs at least two
people.” Id.
99. Id. at 15 (reporting rates from 2000 to 2013). Examples of the types of misconduct
reported include “[l]ying to employees, . . . [d]iscrimination[,] . . . sexual
harassment[,] . . . falsifying company financial data and public reports[,] . . . misleading
information on financial reports[, and offering] a bribe to public officials.” Id. at 20.
100. See, e.g., JOSEPHSON INST. OF ETHICS, 2012 REPORT CARD ON THE ETHICS OF
AMERICAN YOUTH 41 (2012), https://charactercounts.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/
ReportCard-2012-DataTables.pdf (noting that in a survey of high school students, nearly
one-half admitted to cheating on a test during the past year) [https://perma.cc/3Q8H-TY66].
101. MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO DO
WHAT’S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 7 (2011) (citing Francesca Gino & Lamar Pierce,
The Abundance Effect:
Unethical Behavior in the Presence of Wealth, 109
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 142 (2009)); Nina Mazar & Dan
Ariely, Dishonesty in Everyday Life and Its Policy Implications, 25 J. PUB. POL. & MKTG.
117 (2006); Maurice E. Schweitzer, Lisa Ordóñez & Bambi Douma, Goal Setting As a
Motivator of Unethical Behavior, 47 ACAD. MGMT. J. 422 (2004).
102. Alain Cohn et al., Business Culture and Dishonesty in the Banking Industry, 516
NATURE 86, 86 (2014) (finding that “when their professional identity as bank employees is
rendered salient, a significant proportion of [employees of a large, international bank]
become dishonest”).
103. MARTHA DEEVY & MICHAELA BEALS, FIN. FRAUD RESEARCH CTR., THE SCOPE OF
THE PROBLEM: AN OVERVIEW OF FRAUD PREVALENCE MEASUREMENT 19, 28 (2013),
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there is no way of knowing the actual frequency of material law violations,
it seems naïve to think that they are uncommon.
Hamermesh might reply that no one has a crystal ball, and thus it is
impossible to accurately assess the impact of any reform. Hence, even if
his predicted costs are speculative, they still would be plausible. I agree
that those costs are plausible, as I acknowledged in The Banality of
Fraud.104 But the fact that a particular reform has some plausible costs
does not establish that reform’s disutility. What is relevant is a reform’s net
impact—whether the desirable effects of a reform outweigh the potentially
undesirable ones of decreased information. In other words, if we assume
that the predicted costs (loss of some information containing the red flags of
misconduct) will be incurred, would those costs likely offset all other
benefits to be gained from my reform?
To even begin to answer that question, it is necessary to situate those
costs in the context of all other information sources. As I observed in
Gatekeepers Inside Out, information can flow through both informal and
formal communication channels.105 In addition, inside counsel can learn of
information from the perpetrators themselves or from other sources, e.g.,
other inside lawyers, outside vendors, or other employees. By intersecting
these insights, we see that critical information can be gained (1) directly
from perpetrators through informal communications; (2)
from
nonperpetrators through informal communications; (3) directly from
perpetrators through formal communications; and (4) from nonperpetrators
through formal communications. The following two-by-two matrix
classifies the relevant information categories according to the sources of
information (perpetrator vs. nonperpetrator) and their relevant modes of
transmission (informal vs. formal). These information categories are
identified by their respective quadrants.

Informal
Communications
Formal
Communications

Perpetrators*

Nonperpetrators**

Quadrant I

Quadrant II

Quadrant III

Quadrant IV

* Perpetrators are those principally engaged in the wrongdoing. Hamermesh’s central prediction
assumes the perpetrators are senior managers.
** Nonperpetrators include inside counsel, outside counsel, and other company employees who are
not principally engaged in the wrongdoing.

http://fraudresearchcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Scope-of-the-Problem-FINAL_
corrected2.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZSZ-SME8].
104. See supra note 46.
105. See Kim, Gatekeepers, supra note 18, at 448–54.
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The above matrix clarifies that Hamermesh’s central prediction—that
there would be a decrease in informal communications between senior
managers and the general counsel—narrowly concentrates on the
information classified in a single quadrant, namely, Quadrant I
(perpetrators, informal communications). While it is plausible that there
would be a decrease in Quadrant I information, it is only one category of
information sources and may not even be the primary source of critical
information for the general counsel.
First, the general counsel could gain the critical information from formal
or informal conversations with subordinate inside counsel or outside
lawyers (Quadrants II and IV). In larger companies with larger legal
budgets, the general counsel will not handle all legal risks posed, nor will
she be the sole legal mind involved in discussions. Much legal work will be
delegated to subordinate inside counsel as well as outside lawyers, some of
whom may have closer access to the relevant facts. For example, the
Valukas Report found that many of GM’s subordinate inside and outside
lawyers handled cases involving ignition switch and airbag nondeployment
problems in fatal collisions but failed to link the two problems.106 Because
the general counsel is likely to have routine interactions with members of
her legal department, this may be the primary source of critical information
for the general counsel.
Second, the general counsel could gain the critical information from
formal or informal conversations with other employees not directly
involved in the misconduct, including employees staffed in the company’s
compliance, internal audit, or risk departments, as well as other employees
who may be incidental victims of wrongdoing (Quadrants II and IV). For
example, Cynthia Cooper, the former Vice President of Internal Audit and
famed whistleblower at WorldCom, initially learned in 2002 about
WorldCom’s fraudulent accounting practices not from the perpetrator of the
fraud (CFO Scott Sullivan) but from one of its victims. That victim
happened to be a manager in the wireless division who told Cooper that
corporate accounting had taken $400 million out of his reserve account and
used it to boost WorldCom’s income.107 Moreover, this manager was not
alone in his knowledge of the misdeed. WorldCom’s investigative report
observed that “[n]umerous individuals—most of them in financial and
accounting departments, at many levels of the Company and in different
locations around the world—became aware in varying degrees of senior
management’s misconduct.”108 Hamermesh’s myopic focus on informal
communications emanating from the perpetrator ignores the fact that the
corporate scandals publicized at the turn of the century were predominantly
transgressions facilitated by groups of top executives and their advisors,

106. See VALUKAS, supra note 2, at 110–15, 124–42, 211–13.
107. Amanda Ripley, The Night Detective, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 45, 46.
108. BERESFORD ET AL., supra note 61, at 18.
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rather than isolated individuals.109 Group transgressions are naturally
harder to conceal from colleagues within the company.
Third, the general counsel could glean the critical information from
formal discussions with senior managers (Quadrant III). After all,
managers do not consult inside counsel out of a desire to widen their social
network; they consult inside lawyers because their jobs often require them
to do so. In some cases, such as in Enron’s off-balance sheet structured
finance transactions where lawyers drafted the relevant documents and
provided legal opinions, legal assistance may be necessary to perpetrate the
illegal scheme in the first place.110 In those situations, managers have some
built-in incentive to err on the side of more disclosure. If the manager lies
or withholds critical information from inside counsel in an effort to conceal
wrongdoing, he also risks receiving inadequate legal help at his own peril.
Inside lawyers can gain important information during formal discussions
by, for example, interrogating the purpose of the proposed scheme. For
example, if Kristina Mordaunt, a former Enron senior inside attorney, had
genuinely inquired about the purpose of the fraudulent LJM1/Rhythms
Hedging Transaction that was brought to her attention, she might have
learned that it was a “hedge for financial accounting purposes only, lacking
any economic substance or rational business purpose, but was intended by
certain Enron officers to manipulate Enron’s financial statements.”111 In
other cases, legal assistance may not be necessary to the scheme, such as in
a pure accounting fraud, but an adept lawyer, i.e., one who pays attention to
financial issues and has a good “spider sense,” may still be able to catch
wind that something is awry. The point is that inside counsel can still gain
important information during formal consultations and meetings.
That said, we do not actually know the underlying rate at which
perpetrators reveal critical information directly to their inside lawyers—
either formally or informally. Whether perpetrators do so in any given case
will depend on the nature of the wrongdoing (e.g., the degree to which legal
assistance is necessary) and the perpetrator’s state of mind (e.g., intentional
vs. reckless), as well as other characteristics of the perpetrator (e.g.,
loquacious vs. reticent). With respect to intentional misconduct, it is
unclear whether the amount of critical information ordinarily revealed to
inside lawyers would be of threshold significance. As Stephen Bainbridge
and Christina Johnson have noted, “Managers who intentionally commit
fraud or breaches of fiduciary duty will only rarely consult their legal
counsel.”112 And even honest mistakes in judgment may never be
109. See James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering Corporate
Inner Circles, 83 OR. L. REV. 435, 445–57 (2004) (making this point by surveying the
evidence of Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Xerox, Global Crossing, Adelphia Communications,
Qwest, Sprint, and HealthSouth).
110. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Teaching Enron, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1139, 1157–62
(2005) (discussing the legal opinions and documents issued in connection with Enron’s
structured finance transactions).
111. Final Report of Neal Batson, Court Appointed Examiner at 53 app. C, In re Enron
Corp., 357 B.R. 257 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 01-16034), 2003 WL 23109187.
112. Bainbridge & Johnson, supra note 41, at 321.
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acknowledged by the perpetrator. For example, Raymond DeGiorgio, the
GM engineer who originally approved the substandard ignition switch in
2002 and then covertly replaced it in 2006,113 never admitted to anything—
let alone confessed anything to GM’s general counsel. Even when
DeGiorgio was confronted during a deposition in 2013 with
incontrovertible evidence of his colossal errors, he simply testified that he
could not remember.114 Therefore, it is not clear whether the particular
information costs pointed out by Hamermesh are even significant enough
for policymakers to be seriously concerned.
But even if we assume that the information disclosed directly by
perpetrators reaches threshold significance, any decrease in such
information is unlikely to outweigh all other benefits to be gained from my
reform. One such benefit may be an increase in the flow of information
from nonperpetrators to inside counsel. To the extent that redirecting
oversight of the legal department conveys the strong message to company
employees that the board takes compliance very seriously, employees may
be more willing to come forward with critical information.
Another (and perhaps more important) likely benefit of my reform is the
enhanced willingness by the general counsel to intervene in cases of
suspected managerial wrongdoing. Under my reform, the general counsel
is legally protected from retaliation and has at least formal independent
access to the board.115 As a result, she should feel more emboldened to
confront the wrongdoing manager or to take a report of evidence of a
material violation to the board. Under Hamermesh’s reform, the general
counsel has none of these protections and thus remains quite vulnerable
should she confront the wrongdoing manager.
Alden highlighted how important it is for policymakers to understand the
structural forces that frame this moment of ethical choice for inside lawyers.
Lambasting Hamermesh’s reforms for not legally protecting inside counsel
from retaliation, Alden noted:
[P]recisely the situation for which one must be prepared, precisely the
situation for which protective rules are implemented, is
the . . . unfortunate case where senior business managers know very well
what they are doing and are determined to proceed with an illegal course
of conduct in the pursuit of advantage. This is the acid test. This is when
it counts. This is when you need corporate counsel with the intestinal
fortitude and practical ability to say, “Stop.” The last thing in the world
one wants at this juncture is cringing, sycophantic, pliable counsel unable
or unwilling, due to an entirely justified fear of termination and the
tremendous personal consequences which can easily and foreseeably flow
therefrom, to assert themselves successfully against determined, corrupt
senior managers engaged or proposing to engage in illegal conduct.116

113.
114.
115.
116.

VALUKAS, supra note 2, at 51, 98–100, 101 n.416.
Id. at 199.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
Alden, supra note 57, at 165–66.
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As the above passage suggests, saying “stop” is not as easy as people
assume. To be sure, some inside counsel will have the gumption to say
“stop” under any regulatory regime. But for many others, such as former
Apple General Counsel Nancy Heinen117 and the more than twenty other
former inside counsel who were fired, demoted, or forced to resign amidst
investigations or allegations that they had acquiesced in the backdating of
managerial stock options,118 saying “stop” to the senior manager was
apparently not so easy. For these critical moments, hoping that boards have
heeded Hamermesh’s advice to “continually identify[] general counsel’s
independence as a norm”119 will not stop the train wreck.
Hamermesh’s reform fails because it is based on a faulty diagnosis—that
insufficient access to information poses the greatest threat to inside
counsel’s gatekeeping abilities. But, as I suggested in prior work, it is not
so much the lack of information (i.e., the “capacity to monitor”), but rather
the unwillingness to interdict, that poses the greatest obstacle for inside
counsel gatekeepers.120 And these observations, I believe, would still
generally hold true even under my alternative reform. It is noteworthy that
the GM lawyers implicated in the scandal did not suffer from lack of access
to information about the existence of a problem but from a marked
unwillingness to rock the boat in an effort to solve the problem before
them.121 When GM’s CEO Mary Barra finally announced the removal of
these employees, she did not complain that her lawyers were poorly
informed. Rather, she stated that they “simply didn’t do enough: they
didn’t take responsibility; didn’t act with any sense of urgency.”122 On the
more pressing problem of inside counsel’s unwillingness to interdict,
Hamermesh’s reform does little to change the structure on which inside
counsel’s incentives to interdict are grafted. My alternative reform is more
likely to enable the general counsel to take an ethical stand precisely when
it counts.

117. SEC, LITIGATION RELEASE NO. 20683, SEC SETTLES OPTIONS BACKDATING CHARGES
FORMER APPLE GENERAL COUNSEL FOR $2.2 MILLION (2008), https://www.sec.gov/
litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20683.htm [http://perma.cc/KCC7-LVNW].
118. See Yuri Mikulka & John M. Horan, General Counsel Under Attack: Criminal and
Enforcement Proceedings, Investigations, and the Travails of In-House Counsel, AM. BAR
ASS’N (Oct. 17, 2007), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/corporate/docs/
2007_materials_underattack.pdf (identifying seventy-seven inside counsel targeted in
criminal and enforcement proceedings and investigations and identifying counsel implicated
in options backdating) [https://perma.cc/797F-CX6S].
119. Hamermesh, supra note 24, at 379.
120. See Kim, Gatekeepers, supra note 18, at 457, 460–61.
121. Lawrence Buonomo, Head of Product Litigation and, since 2012, Chair of the Legal
Review Committee that decided settlements, “saw numerous fatal crash cases pass before
him”; William Kemp, Counsel for GM’s Global Engineering Organization, was a member of
that same committee since 2006 and as early as 2004 was involved in ignition switch
problems; Jennifer Sevigny, Head of GM’s Field Performance Assessment Group, worked
on assessments of the ignition switch problem. Sue Reisinger, GM In-House Lawyers
‘Removed’ in Ignition-Switch Purge, CORP. COUNS. ONLINE (June 9, 2014) (available online
through Lexis Advance).
122. Id.
WITH
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In sum, the principal behavioral assumption on which Hamermesh’s
central prediction rests—that the general counsel will become appreciably
“adversarial” in the ordinary course—is far-fetched. As a consequence, the
central prediction on which his critique is based—that there would be a
decrease in informal communications between senior managers and the
general counsel as a response to a perceived change in the general counsel’s
demeanor—remains speculative. And even assuming that his central
prediction bears out, information disclosed directly by the perpetrators
themselves is only one source of information and may not even be of
threshold significance. Accordingly, any decrease in such information is
unlikely to outweigh all the other benefits to be gained from my reform—
foremost of which is the increase in counsel’s willingness to interdict when
faced with evidence of a material breach in legal obligations.
III. COMPETING VISIONS
Above I described the basic empirical disagreements underlying our two
proposals. But perhaps these empirical disagreements mask the deeper
philosophical differences between our disparate approaches. Indeed, our
respective reforms are animated by two different understandings of the
inside counsel role. In this part, I critique the “lawyer as friend” analogy
that inspires Hamermesh’s vision for the role of inside lawyers. Along the
way, I describe an alternative vision—“lawyer as gatekeeper”—a vision
demonstrably espoused by the respondents in Tanina Rostain’s 2008 pilot
empirical study of the general counsel of ten blue-chip companies.123
Hamermesh invokes the “lawyer as friend” analogy explicitly in two
rhetorical questions, which he believed definitively resolved the principal
empirical issues raised by our respective proposals:
(1) [I]n a situation involving potentially adverse regulatory consequences
(e.g., financial penalties or even imprisonment), is it more
comfortable, other things being equal, to share personal and
confidential information about the situation with a policeman or
regulator or with a close friend?124
(2) [I]s a suggestion that some course of conduct may be improper and
should be avoided more likely to be accepted and internalized if
received from a close friend, or from someone perceived as an
enforcer whose incentives include avoiding potential liability for any
failure to stop improper conduct?125

Hamermesh also invokes the analogy implicitly, by repeatedly suggesting
that “trust and confidence,” “trust,” “trust and respect,” or “intimacy” are
the primary reasons why employees share confidential corporate
information.126 In fact, “trust” or “trust and confidence” is invoked

123.
124.
125.
126.

See generally Rostain, supra note 95.
Hamermesh, supra note 24, at 376 (emphasis added).
Id. at 378 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., id. at 359, 368, 374–76.
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eighteen times in his essay.127 As the senior manager’s close friend, the
inside lawyer’s principal role remains that of giving advice; indeed,
Hamermesh seems to privilege the advice-giving function of inside lawyers
above all other functions.128 Hamermesh recommends that general counsel
cultivate “an active advisory relationship of trust and confidence with senior
management”129 such that managers will come to regard the general
counsel as the “persuasive counselor.”130 Hamermesh urges boards to
encourage “a relationship in which the general counsel is expected to
engage in an advisory function with the CEO and other senior officers.”131
Of course, the friendship analogy is a familiar one, especially for legal
ethicists. Simon observed that the friendship analogy may have surfaced as
early as the seventeenth century as a justification for the attorney-client
privilege in the law of evidence.132 As it was understood then, the rule
mandating confidentiality followed from the more general principle that
“gentlemen do not reveal each other’s confidences.”133 And analogies to
friendship have been invoked in legal articles dating back to the 1950s.134
The first formal defense of friendship as the proper model for the lawyerclient relationship occurred in 1976, when Charles Fried published The
Lawyer As Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relation.135 In the essay, Fried defended the moral praiseworthiness of
lawyers serving their clients by drawing an analogy to friends helping
friends.136 Just as ordinary individuals are morally justified in preferring
the interests of their friends and family over everyone else, Fried argued,
lawyers are morally justified in preferring their clients’ interests over those
of the “wider collectivity”—third parties or the public at large.137 The
moral right of individuals to lavish care on close others, even at the expense

127. Id. abstract, 361, 374, 375, 375–76 (twice), 376 (twice), 377, 378 (twice), 379, 385
(twice), 386 (four times).
128. See, e.g., id. at 382–83 (“The general counsel’s ability to achieve the stature and
access to information . . . is . . . viewed as dependent on the establishment of a close working
relationship with the CEO, a relationship in which the general counsel is expected to engage
in an advisory function with the CEO and other senior officers, rather than simply manage
delegation of responsibility for providing legal services to the corporation.” (emphasis
added)).
129. Id. at 379 (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 380 (emphasis added) (quoting E. Norman Veasey & Christin T. Di
Guglielmo, The Tensions, Stresses, and Professional Responsibilities of the Lawyer for the
Corporation, 62 BUS. LAW. 1, 28 (2006)).
131. Id. at 383 (emphasis added).
132. See William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and
Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 107.
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., CHARLES P. CURTIS, IT’S YOUR LAW 1 (1954) (“Justice is a chilly virtue. It
is of high importance that we be introduced into the inhospitable halls of justice by a
friend.”).
135. Fried, supra note 27.
136. See id. at 1073 (“When I say the lawyer is his client’s legal friend, I mean the lawyer
makes his client’s interests his own insofar as this is necessary to preserve and foster the
client’s autonomy within the law.”).
137. Id. at 1066.
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of distant others, Fried argued, was integral to preserving the fundamental
moral interests of personality, identity, and liberty.138
Fried’s arguments have proven controversial.139 Indeed, the friendship
analogy has been deftly criticized on both normative140 and descriptive
grounds.141 Here is not the place to weigh in on the debate and further
interrogate the propriety or utility of the analogy as applied to the legal
profession as a whole. Suffice it to say that, for purposes of this Article,
Hamermesh’s invocation of the friendship analogy seems particularly inapt
for the in-house role and the types of factual scenarios specifically invoked
by Hamermesh and contemplated by our respective reforms.
First, friendship poorly reflects what inside lawyers should do if and
when faced with serious managerial misconduct. On these occasions,
Hamermesh recommends that the lawyer should invite the wrongdoing
manager’s “trust and confidence” in the lawyer to afford the lawyer ample
opportunity to dissuade the manager from proceeding with his illicit plans.
I agree that the first thing that lawyers should do in such a scenario is to
attempt to dissuade the manager from doing wrong. But on what basis is it
appropriate for the lawyer to invite the manager’s trust and confidence?
Although Hamermesh repeatedly invokes “trust and confidence” as the
main inducement for the manager’s voluntary disclosure to the lawyer,142
he does not answer the critical question that is raised: Trust and confidence
in what?
As a matter of professional responsibility and fiduciary obligation, the
lawyer cannot reassure the manager that his communication will remain
confidential143 or that the manager will be shielded from adverse
consequences.144 After all, that manager will usually not be entitled to
those assurances. As Simon explained, “[The] authority to invoke or waive
the organization’s confidentiality rights usually belongs to organizational

138. Id. at 1067–68, 1074.
139. See, e.g., Jerold S. Auerbach, What Has the Teaching of Law to Do with Justice?, 53
N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 468 (1978); Robert J. Condlin, “What’s Love Got to Do with It?” “It’s
Not Like They’re Your Friends for Christ’s Sake”: The Complicated Relationship Between
Lawyer and Client, 82 NEB. L. REV. 211 (2003); Edward A. Dauer & Arthur A. Leff,
Correspondence: The Lawyer As Friend, 86 YALE L.J. 573, 579 (1977); Alan Donagan,
Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary System, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS’ ROLES
AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS 128 (David Luban ed., 1983); David Luban, The Adversary System
Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra, at 84, 104–
11; Simon, supra note 132, at 106–13.
140. For example, Luban noted, “[W]e are not . . . willing to do grossly immoral things to
help our friends, nor should we be.” Luban, supra note 139, at 106 (emphasis added).
141. For example, Simon remarked, “Fried’s lawyer is a friend in the same sense that
your Sunoco dealer is ‘very friendly’ or that Canada Dry Ginger Ale ‘tastes like love.’”
Simon, supra note 132, at 109.
142. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 48, at 1468 (“[C]orporate counsel can never assure
managers of strong confidentiality.”).
144. Id. at 1467 (“[W]e know that corporations often cooperate in prosecutions against
errant former managers in order to gain leniency for themselves. And they sometimes sue
former managers for damages for wrongdoing. Boards have a fiduciary duty to sacrifice
managers when it is in the interest of the organization to do so.”).
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agents different from those who made the confidential communications.”145
If the manager is actively planning or engaging in material breaches of legal
obligation, he is acting disloyally and likely exposing the organization to
significant legal liability. Hence, that manager is legally adverse to the
organization and its lawyers with whom he now has an active conflict of
interest. Because the lawyer may be required to report the conversation up
the ladder to the board,146 or even be required to testify against the manager
in a court of law,147 it would be entirely inappropriate for the lawyer to
reassure her colleague of her continuing loyalty or confidentiality. Contrary
to what has been implicitly suggested, the lawyer’s duty of
“[c]onfidentiality will not block disclosure within the organization, and it
will not prevent the organization from disclosing outside, no matter how
harmful internal or external disclosure is to the [manager].”148
Indeed, the leading treatise on in-house practice advises inside counsel in
these sticky situations to tread lightly and give the manager a “‘corporate
Miranda warning,’ which puts the manager on notice that counsel owes a
duty of loyalty to the company alone (and not to any manager) and thus
cannot promise confidentiality or loyalty to any individual manager.”149 To
suggest that inside lawyers position themselves as close friends and invite
the wrongdoing manager’s (continued) trust and confidence not only
ignores the legally adverse nature of the lawyer-manager relationship but
also contradicts what are widely accepted as “best practices” for inside
counsel. In these types of situations, the only thing that the lawyer can
properly promise the manager is that she will listen carefully and not rush to
judgment, which is the behavior that anyone would reasonably expect of a
competent professional (irrespective of any preexisting friendship).
Of course, it is certainly possible that the lawyer will successfully
dissuade the manager from going forward with his illicit plan. This good
result may be reached through some form of moral dialogue that
Hamermesh and others are right to recommend.150 What Hamermesh
blithely ignores, however, is the sobering reality that persuasion does not
145. See William H. Simon, Duties to Organizational Clients, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
(forthcoming 2016) (on file with author).
146. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1–.7 (2016); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(b) &
cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). Moreover, lawyers generally have the discretion to report out
material corporate misconduct. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) (permitting lawyers to “reveal to
the Commission, without the issuer’s consent, confidential information related to the
representation” under specified circumstances); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.
1.13(c).
147. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 48, at 1468 (“Recall . . . that the privilege protects only
the communication and not the information it contains. This means that when a corporate
lawyer learns something that he must disclose under the civil discovery or securities laws,
the privilege does not affect his duty to see that the information is disclosed, whether or not
the communicating manager wishes the information disclosed.”).
148. Simon, supra note 145, at 10.
149. Kim, Gatekeepers, supra note 18, at 444 (citing John K. Villa, When and How to
Issue Corporate Miranda Warnings, 24 ACC DOCKET 76 (2006)).
150. See Hamermesh, supra note 24, at 380; Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, Rethinking
Lawyer Regulation: How a Relational Approach Would Improve Professional Rules and
Roles, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 513, 525–26.
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always work. Not all lawyers will be skillful in the art of moral suasion,
and sophisticated senior managers, who find themselves in desperate
enough situations to be considering wrongdoing in the first place, may not
be receptive to it.151 Sometimes the only option available to the lawyer is
to issue a stern warning that higher-ups may need to be alerted.152 As Elihu
Root put it, “About half the practice of a decent lawyer consists in telling
would-be clients that they are damned fools and should stop.”153 And, even
if the manager does back down, Hamermesh is wrong to assume that this is
where the lawyer’s duty to escalate necessarily ends: the inside lawyer may
still have an organizational duty or expectation to report the conversation up
the ladder, if in her considered judgment she believes that the manager
continues to pose a threat to the organization.154
Second, as a descriptive matter, friendship does not accurately portray
how some general counsel perceive their role and their relationship with
senior managers. In particular, the notion of friendship discounts, if not
entirely ignores, the general counsel’s gatekeeping function and the
seriousness with which general counsel regard their legal obligation to
protect the organization from harm. In many companies, “inside counsel
are intentionally carved into corporate decision-making process to constrain
151. While I agree that moral dialogue is important, there is no evidence that it works to
any significant degree. As Condlin has noted with respect to outside lawyers representing
clients who want to pursue an immoral course of action:
[M]ore dialogue is as likely to lead to intransigence, capitulation, impasse, and
polarization, as it is to consensus, and its outcome, when it reaches one, is as likely
to be based on stamina, deceit, and obstreperousness, as it is on insight and
learning. Even ostensible agreement can be misleading if the person more skilled
at “dialogue” (i.e., more glib), has simply silenced rather than convinced the
person less skilled, by talking him into the ground. In the end, there are only two
principled courses of action open to lawyers who are unwilling to withdraw from a
representation, and who disagree with their clients about how to proceed. They
can do what the clients say, or they can coerce the clients into accepting their (the
lawyers’) views instead.
Condlin, supra note 139, at 288–89.
152. None of this is to deny the fact that some general counsel may have final authority
on some issues. See, e.g., BEN W. HEINEMAN, JR., THE INSIDE COUNSEL REVOLUTION:
RESOLVING THE PARTNER-GUARDIAN TENSION (forthcoming Ankerwycke Press 2016) (draft
manuscript dated Feb. 1, 2016, on file with author).
153. 1 PHILIP C. JESSUP, ELIHU ROOT 133 (1938) (quoting Elihu Root); see also
HEINEMAN, supra note 152.
154. This organizational duty or expectation may emanate from company policy or
practice. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. e (2000)
(“A lawyer is also required to act diligently . . . by taking steps to prevent reasonably
foreseeable harm to a client. . . . The lawyer is not prevented by rules of confidentiality from
acting to protect the interests of the organization by disclosing within the organization
communications gained from constituents who are not themselves clients.”); see also id. § 96
cmt. b (“By representing the organization, a lawyer does not thereby also form a clientlawyer relationship with all or any individuals employed by it or who direct its
operations . . . . A lawyer representing only an organization does not owe duties of
care[,] . . . diligence[,] . . . or confidentiality . . . to constituents of the organization.”). To be
sure, the lawyer who has (ill-advisedly) solicited the manager’s trust and confidence and
then turns around and reports up the ladder will be perceived as having pulled a bait-andswitch. I could not agree more with this characterization, which is precisely why
Hamermesh’s friendship analogy is inapt and misleading.
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managerial discretion and safeguard the company from legal trouble.”155
While providing disinterested advice to business managers is a valuable
function of the in-house role, it is not the only—and may not be the most
important—function. Inside counsel not only advise others but also act,156
and their actions can have as much legal significance as the actions of their
business coagents.
Furthermore, “inside counsel often have direct
responsibility over compliance and are expected to intervene when
significant legal risks are at stake.”157 In the best companies, inside counsel
do not take that responsibility lightly.
For example, the general counsel respondents in Rostain’s 2008 study
“articulated a robust account of their jurisdiction over questions of legal
risk.”158 They were not resigned to playing the role of mere advisors-forhire—giving advice and then looking the other way. Instead, her
respondents “were unanimous in insisting that responsibility for
determining the appropriate level of risk to be undertaken by their
companies lay with them.”159 They characterized their gatekeeping
functions “in very strong terms” and were “confident of their capacity to
stop deals that they believed posed significant legal risks to the
company.”160 Although they occasionally judged it appropriate to cede the
final call on low-level risks to managers, these general counsel “were the
ultimate arbiters of which risks were negotiable and which were not,”161
and they professed a willingness to say “no” in situations implicating
significant civil or criminal liability.162 In short, these general counsel
expressed an alternative vision to the “lawyer as friend.” Indeed, they were
strong exemplars of the “lawyer as gatekeeper.”
To be sure, not all inside lawyers exercise their gatekeeping functions as
robustly as the general counsel in Rostain’s study. One reason for this is
that many inside counsel are not sheltered by employment agreements163
and thus remain economically vulnerable to their client representatives.
This economic vulnerability provides the third reason why Hamermesh’s
friendship analogy is malapropos. As I noted in The Banality of Fraud:
First, inside counsel are necessarily economically dependent on a
single client. If they get fired, they lose their entire income, their
insurance, and their basic livelihood. If pensions or stock options have
not vested, then enormous sums of money can be forfeited as well. Even
worse, if they get fired for whistleblowing, they may get blacklisted—
without recourse under the law to sue for retaliatory discharge.

155. Sung Hui Kim, The Ethics of In-House Practice, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL
DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 197, 198 (Lynn Mather & Leslie Levin eds., 2012).
156. HEINEMAN, supra note 152.
157. Kim, supra note 155, at 198.
158. Rostain, supra note 95, at 473. The following brief summary of the findings in
Rostain’s study is largely duplicative of Kim, supra note 155, at 215.
159. Rostain, supra note 95, at 473.
160. Id. at 473–74.
161. Id. at 479.
162. Id.
163. HEINEMAN, supra note 152.
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Second, even if getting fired is not likely, inside counsel feels
unremitting pressure to justify herself and her department as a corporate
cost center. In today’s competitive and profit-oriented environment, no
position feels completely secure, and the case that an adequate return on
firm investment is being achieved must always be made. The best way to
do so is to facilitate, not interfere with, corporate transactions favored by
management.164

The typical friendship is not characterized by this degree of economic
vulnerability or dependency. Stated another way, by invoking “friendship,”
Hamermesh too casually dismisses important aspects of the lawyer-client
relationship, namely, the prominent role of money. As Simon observed in
his critique of Lawyer As Friend, “[I]f Fried’s definition is amplified to
reflect the qualification . . . that the lawyer adopts the client’s interests for
money, it becomes apparent that Fried has described the classical notion,
not of friendship, but of prostitution.”165 Not only does Hamermesh ignore
the economic vulnerability of inside counsel but he also ignores its potential
ethical consequences. As Max Bazerman and Ann Tenbrunsel explain in
their discussion of “motivated blindness,” a “core finding of behavioral
ethics” is that “if you are motivated to turn a blind eye to someone’s
unethical behavior, you won’t see it,” even when you regard yourself as
honest.166
Fourth, encouraging lawyers to serve as managers’ close friends
exacerbates enduring psychological pressures to overlook wrongdoing in an
effort to reduce cognitive dissonance.167 As Deborah Rhode and Paul Paton
noted:
To reduce the cognitive dissonance, lawyers will often unconsciously
dismiss or discount evidence of misconduct and its impact on third
parties. The risks of such dissonance are exacerbated when lawyers bond
socially and professionally with the client’s management team. The more
that counsel blends into the culture of corporate insiders, the greater the
pressures of cohesiveness. That, in turn, encourages lawyers to
underestimate risk and to suppress compromising information in order to
preserve internal solidarity. Yet, in the long run, this dynamic ill serves
all concerned. Clients lose access to disinterested advice about their own
liability; lawyers lose capacity for independent judgment and moral
autonomy; and the public loses protection from organizational
misconduct. Enron is a case history of all those costs.168

Hence, Hamermesh’s recommendation that inside lawyers pose as
managers’ close friends may perversely lead to greater, not less,
acquiescence in managerial misconduct.
164. Kim, Banality, supra note 18, at 1005–06.
165. Simon, supra note 132, at 108.
166. BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 101, at 81.
167. Cognitive dissonance theory predicts that when a person exhibits behavior that
seems inconsistent with her prior attitudes such that psychic unrest is aroused, her internal
attitudes will shift to generate greater alignment with her outward behavior. See Kim, Naked
Self-Interest, supra note 18, at 146–48 (describing cognitive dissonance theory).
168. Rhode & Paton I, supra note 49, at 32.
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The friendship analogy is not just ill-suited to situations of managerial
misconduct. The fifth reason for rejecting the analogy is that it
mischaracterizes the ordinary, default understanding of employee
relationships and the more formal nature of office interactions in most
corporate settings. Of course, friendships can and do arise in office settings
and, yes, lawyers can and do find friends among their nonlawyer
colleagues.169 But friendship is by no means the primary mode of office
interactions. To briefly illustrate this point, let us turn to the sole piece of
evidence cited by Hamermesh to support his central empirical prediction
that the “general counsel would lose the benefit of the informal
communications from senior managers.”170 Hamermesh first promises that
his prediction will bear out because “[t]here is evidence . . . both anecdotal
and more sweeping, that access to information correlates directly with the
level of trust and confidence reposed by the source with the recipient.”171
While withholding the so-called “sweeping” evidence of such correlation,
Hamermesh proceeds to offer his “anecdotal” evidence in a single footnote:
See, e.g., Stan Schroeder, Facebook Privacy: 10 Settings Every User
Needs to Know, MASHABLE.COM (Feb. 7, 2011), http://
mashable.com/2011/02/07/facebook-privacy-guide/ (“[Y]ou might want
to customize the settings and set a certain type of content to be visible to
the people on some of your lists, and invisible to others. For example,
only my close friends can see all my photos, while business associates can
see just a few.”).172

The above internet blogpost explains how a single user customizes his
Facebook settings. If this blogpost supports anything, it likely supports a
proposition that undermines Hamermesh’s point: that managers do not
ordinarily think of their office colleagues (including lawyers) as friends.
According to this blogger, “[O]nly my close friends can see all my photos,
while business associates can see just a few.”173 It must have escaped
Hamermesh’s attention that inside lawyers would more readily be classified
as “business associates” than as “close friends.”
Finally, not only does Hamermesh’s “lawyer as friend” vision poorly
describe the default mode of office interactions but, as specifically
portrayed by Hamermesh, the vision is also inconsistent with the notion of
friendship itself. Hamermesh’s recommendation that inside counsel act as
“close friends” of senior managers is predicated on the promise that inside
counsel will not only be able to gain access to information but also will gain

169. Cf. Condlin, supra note 139, at 296–97 (“It is not that lawyers and clients can never
be friends, but just that when they are it will be because of qualities independent of their
status as lawyers and clients. Put another way, lawyers and clients will be friends when they
would be friends if they were not lawyers and clients; being lawyers and clients has nothing
to do with forming friendships, one way or the other.”).
170. Hamermesh, supra note 24, at 374.
171. Id. at 375 (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 375 n.57 (emphasis added).
173. Id. (emphasis added).
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“respect,” “stature,” and “authority” within the company.174 Hamermesh
writes:
The general counsel’s ability to achieve the stature and access to
information enabling her to most effectively counsel the corporation is
widely and plausibly viewed as dependent on the establishment of a close
working relationship with the CEO[;] a direct and close relationship with
the CEO can only enhance the general counsel’s stature and authority
within the company, not to mention her or his access to corporate strategy
development and critical internal information[;] . . . [e]stablishing a direct
relationship between general counsel and independent directors is also
likely to enhance general counsel’s stature.175

The reasons offered by Hamermesh for following his advice are self-serving
and careerist; they seem opportunistic and deeply inconsistent with the
notion of friendship.176
In sum, Hamermesh’s plea that inside lawyers position themselves as
close friends ignores the legally adverse status of malfeasant managers in
the relevant contexts and contradicts established best practices. It does not
accurately portray how many general counsel understand their relationships
with senior managers and too heavily discounts the gravity with which
some general counsel perceive their gatekeeping function. At the same
time, it ignores the economic vulnerability of many inside counsel and the
related phenomenon of motivated blindness, trivializing financial pressures
to acquiesce in misconduct. And it ignores the very real psychological
pressures to overlook wrongdoing in an effort to reduce cognitive
dissonance. It also badly mischaracterizes the default way in which
corporate employees interact with one another in office settings. By
assuming that friendship is the governing norm in office suites, Hamermesh
confuses friendship with friendliness177 and confuses corporate workplaces
with college fraternities. Moreover, Hamermesh’s prescription that inside
lawyers pose as friends of management for instrumental self-serving benefit
undermines the very notion of friendship itself.
CONCLUSION
Despite the inaptness of the “lawyer as friend” vision, that vision is
superficially appealing and may even have guided the conduct of the GM
174. Id. at 382–83.
175. Id. (emphasis added).
176. Cf. Condlin, supra note 139, at 267 (“True friendship is based principally on love
rather than self-interest. While there are utilitarian dimensions to friendship, true friends are
loved for their own sake and for the goodness of their character, not for the advantage they
can help one realize.”).
177. See, e.g., Condlin, supra note 139, at 294–95 (“Friendliness is simply a social
practice designed to make day-to-day interaction pleasant and efficient by removing the
friction produced by overinterpretation of the other’s motives. One can be friendly toward
anyone, even an enemy, under just about any circumstances, and should be most of the time,
but one can be a friend to someone only under the demanding conditions described above,
and even then, only when the other person wants to be a friend in return, and is willing to
invest the time and energy needed to develop the relationship.”).

1896

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

lawyers. According to the Valukas Report, in a 2012 meeting about the
nondeployment of a Cobalt airbag, a junior GM lawyer inquired whether
there should be a recall. He was promptly “told that the issue had already
been raised with engineering, that the engineers were working on it, and
that they had not come up with a solution.”178 The junior lawyer reportedly
“got the ‘vibe’ that the lawyers had ‘done everything [they could] do.’”179
This behavior is entirely consistent with the “lawyer as friend” vision,
which posits that the lawyer’s role is merely to facilitate the autonomous
decisionmaking of other individuals. Under this vision, the problems with
the Cobalt essentially belonged to someone else (i.e., the engineers).
Accordingly, so long as the GM lawyers flagged the legal risks to
responsible engineers and made themselves available to provide
confidential advice, they had discharged their “friendship” responsibilities
in full.
By all accounts, the notoriously ineffective GM lawyers had been
regarded as trustworthy friends. Three of the four terminated GM lawyers
were longstanding employees who each served thirty years at GM before
being removed.180 And one of those longstanding GM lawyers was
William Kemp, GM’s lead engineering and safety lawyer. According to the
Valukas Report, Kemp was “widely regarded as GM’s most
knowledgeable, experienced and trusted safety lawyer.”181 Yet, it was this
most trusted lawyer who failed to protect GM, its customers, and its
reputation. As early as 2004, Kemp negotiated with the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration over the problem of moving stalls in GM’s
vehicles.182 He also orchestrated GM’s in-house investigation of the
defective ignition switch for more than two years prior to the recall.183
When finally asked during the internal investigation about why he waited so
long—until February 2014—to directly notify the general counsel about the
Cobalt problems, Kemp replied that he did not know.184 Unfortunately,
what GM needed at this critical juncture in its history was something other
than a friend.
But there is an alternative vision—that of “lawyer as gatekeeper.” This
vision insists that the GM lawyers could have done otherwise and that it
was not enough to simply hand off issues to engineering to be resolved by
them and merely stand by to provide just-in-time legal advice. This vision
rejects the proposition that lawyers are there merely to facilitate the
autonomous decision making of other individuals. This vision understands
that serious safety problems are not the problems of someone else but are
GM’s problems for which the GM lawyers are directly responsible for
resolving as expeditiously as possible. Although this vision understands
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that the GM lawyers, not being engineers, could not have resolved the
ignition switch defect on their own, they should have assumed ownership of
the problem before them and not permitted it to languish in dead-end
investigations and fester as one committee meeting after another got
postponed. This vision understands that the GM lawyers should have
reported the problem to the general counsel years earlier and, if the general
counsel were not responsive, further escalated the issue up the ladder to the
board—even if doing so would be perceived as brazen. This vision
understands that being an inside lawyer is not a popularity contest and
certainly not about making friends. Rather, being an inside lawyer is about
protecting the organization—even from threats arising from within.

